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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
The sole but important issue in this appeal, which stems 
from an action alleging a violation of section 402(b)(3) of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 
U.S.C. S 1102(b)(3) ("ERISA"), has already been framed for 
us by the Supreme Court in its mandate to our court on 
remand.1 In particular, we will address the question directly 
posed by the Supreme Court: "[W]hether Curtiss-Wright's 
valid amendment procedure -- amendment `by the 
company' -- was complied with in this case." Curtiss-Wright 
Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 85 (1995). The parties 
agree that we should apply principles of Delaware corporate 
law to resolve that question. See Schoonejongen v. Curtiss- 
Wright Corp., Nos. 92-5695, 92-5710 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 
1995) (unpublished opinion). 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
A. Procedural History 
 
The long and contentious history of this case, which 
spans over fourteen years of litigation, is set forth in 
Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 18 F.3d 1034 (3d 
Cir. 1994), when this court first considered the matter. To 
summarize, the Curtiss-Wright Corporation ("CW") actively 
maintained a retirement health benefits plan ("the Plan") for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court asserted subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the 
civil enforcement provisions in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1132. Jurisdiction of 
this court arises out of 28 U.S.C. S 1291 to review the district court's 
final order granting summary judgment. 
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all non-bargaining unit employees who worked at its 
production facilities, including one such plant in Wood 
Ridge, New Jersey. These retirement health benefits, 
granted in 1966, were governed by two principal 
documents: the Plan Constitution and the Summary Plan 
Description ("SPD"). In early 1983, CW purportedly issued 
an amended SPD providing that upon the closure of a CW 
plant, health benefits for that facility's retirees would be 
terminated.2 Later that year, CW closed its Wood Ridge 
plant and accordingly notified the plant's retirees of the 
termination of health benefits. Mr. Richard Sprigle, who 
was the Executive Vice President in charge of the facility's 
operations, informed Wood Ridge retirees of this 
termination under the amended SPD by a letter dated 
November 4, 1983. 
 
In 1984, the affected retirees instituted a class action in 
the district court, alleging that CW had wrongfully 
terminated their retirement health benefits and that they 
had a vested right to these benefits for life. After six years 
of litigation and a bench trial, the district court in 1990 
dismissed most of the plaintiffs' claims, including one 
contention that CW had contractually bound itself to 
provide retirement health benefits for life. The district court 
found, however, that the revised SPD language concerning 
the termination of benefits constituted an "amendment" to 
the Plan and therefore fell within ERISA's section 402(b)(3), 
which requires that every employee benefit plan must 
"provide a procedure for amending such plan, and for 
identifying the persons who have authority to amend the 
plan." 29 U.S.C. S 1102(b)(3). The district court then held 
that, as an amendment, the relevant SPD language was not 
adopted under an amendment procedure as required by 
ERISA. Therefore, the district court concluded that the 
terminations of health benefits under the amended Plan 
were void ab initio and ordered CW to pay a significant 
amount in retroactive benefits. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This addition to the SPD, found under the heading "Termination of 
Health Care Benefits," reads: "Coverage under this Plan will cease for 
retirees and their dependents upon the termination of business 
operations of the facility from which they retired." App. at 334. 
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On appeal to our court, CW argued that the revised SPD 
language was in fact adopted under an amendment 
procedure contained in a standard reservation clause which 
provided that "[t]he Company reserves the right at any time 
and from time to time to modify or amend, in whole or in 
part, any or all of the provisions of the Plan." CW 
contended that this procedure was valid under section 
402(b)(3) because it identified "the Company" with the 
authority to amend the retirement benefits plan. This court 
rejected that argument, reasoning that the purpose behind 
the section 402(b)(3) requirement was to "ensure that all 
interested parties will know how a plan may be altered and 
who may make such alternations. Only if they know this 
information will they be able to determine with certainty at 
any given time exactly what the plan provides." 
Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 18 F.3d 1034, 1038 
(3d Cir. 1994). As a result, our court reasoned that section 
402(b)(3) requires enumeration with specificity "what 
individuals or bodies within the Company could promulgate 
an effective amendment." Id. at 1039. Because simply 
identifying "the Company" did not explicitly identify such 
individuals or bodies, the court affirmed the district court, 
holding that CW adopted the revised SPD under an 
amendment procedure that failed to comply with ERISA 
section 402(b)(3). 
 
The Supreme Court granted CW's petition for certiorari 
and reversed in a unanimous opinion. The Court observed 
that the text of section 402(b)(3) contains only two 
requirements: "a `procedure for amending [the] plan' and `[a 
procedure] for identifying the persons who have authority to 
amend the plan.' " Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 
514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (quoting 29 U.S.C. S 1102(b)(3)) 
(alteration and emphasis in original). Next, the Court held 
that merely identifying "the Company" with the authority to 
amend the plan comports with a literal reading of the 
section, as nothing in the statute required an identification 
with any more particularity. The Court noted, however, that 
for "the Company" language to make sense, there must be 
some reference to principles of corporate law in order to 
determine who has authority to make decisions on behalf of 
a company.3 Id. at 80-81. As to whether CW's reservation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Supreme Court cited Judge Roth's concurring reasoning on this 
point. See Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 80 (citing Schoonejongen, 18 F.3d 
at 1039 n.3). 
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clause constituted a procedure for amending the plan, the 
Court once again reasoned that the literal terms of section 
402(b)(3) are ultimately indifferent as to the level of detail in 
an amendment procedure or in an identification procedure. 
Because the unilateral authority to terminate a plan is still 
a "procedure" nonetheless, the reservation clause, in the 
Court's view, satisfied this prong of section 402(b)(3). 
 
The Court then remanded the case to our court to 
determine "whether Curtiss-Wright's valid amendment 
procedure -- amendment `by the Company' -- was complied 
with in this case." Id. at 85. The Supreme Court instructed 
us that "[t]he answer will depend on a fact-intensive 
inquiry, under applicable corporate law principles, into 
what persons or committees within Curtiss-Wright 
possessed plan amendment authority, either by express 
delegation or impliedly, and whether those persons or 
committees actually approved the new plan provision 
contained in the revised SPD." Id. If, the Court continued, 
the revised plan is found not to have been properly 
authorized when issued, the question would then arise 
whether any subsequent actions attributable to CW could 
serve to ratify the amendment ex post. The Court 
specifically identified as a possible basis for ratification the 
November 4, 1983 letter under Mr. Sprigle's name 
informing individual retirees of the termination. Id. 
 
On remand from the Supreme Court, both parties argued 
before us that it was possible to decide the case on the 
existing record. The panel, however, decided that a remand 
to the district court was appropriate because of a factual 
dispute -- namely, whether anyone at CW possessed the 
actual or implied authority to amend the plan. See 
Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., Nos 92-5695, 92- 
5710 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 1995) (unpublished opinion). In 
remanding, we rejected the argument raised by CW that the 
Board in 1990 had retroactively ratified the Plan by 
resolution so that there was no need to consider questions 
of authority. We held that under Delaware corporate law a 
"[r]atification cannot relate back so as to defeat intervening 
rights of strangers to the transactions." Id. at 4 (quoting 2A 
William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of 
Private Corporations S 782, at 647-48 (perm. rev. ed. 1992)) 
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(alteration in original); see also Essential Enterprises Corp. 
v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 164 A.2d 437 (Del. Ch. 
1960). Because the ex post ratification of the amended SPD 
would defeat the rights of third parties, this court rejected 
the 1990 attempted ratification by the board and 
accordingly remanded the matter to the district court for 
further proceedings with respect to the actual or implied 
authority of CW to adopt the 1983 amendment or to ratify 
it. 
 
B. Facts Discovered on Remand 
 
Renewed discovery by the parties in the district court 
revealed the following undisputed facts. CW is a Delaware 
corporation and has adopted by-laws applicable at all times 
here pertinent which gives the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors, as Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), "general and 
active control of [the corporation's] business and affairs." 
App. at 441. They expressly include the authority to sign all 
contracts, obligations, and other instruments on behalf of 
the corporation. Id. The by-laws further designate the 
President as the Chief Operating Officer and bestow 
"general and active control of [the corporation's] 
operations," including the authority to execute contracts, 
fix employee compensation other than primary officers, and 
"all other duties and powers usually appertaining to the 
office of president of a corporation," except as otherwise 
stated in the by-laws. Id. at 441-43. Finally, the by-laws 
provide that the Vice-Presidents "shall perform all such 
duties and exercise all such powers as may be provided by 
these by-laws or as may from time to time be determined by 
the Board of Directors, ... the Chairman, or the President." 
Id. at 443. 
 
Mr. T. Roland Berner, who died in the spring of 1990, 
long before remand to the district court, was CW's 
Chairman of the Board, CEO, and President. Mr. Charles 
Ehinger and Mr. Richard Sprigle, both now retired, were 
CW's two Executive Vice Presidents. While the precise 
responsibilities of Mr. Ehinger and Mr. Sprigle are the 
subject of some disagreement between the parties to this 
action, although not between the two Vice Presidents 
themselves, it is not disputed that Mr. Ehinger generally 
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handled corporate staff issues for all CW employees and 
Mr. Sprigle was essentially in charge of operations at the 
Wood Ridge facility in New Jersey. App. at 181, 247. 
 
Discovery before the district court also yielded the 
following undisputed facts relating to the Plan's history. 
CW's post-retirement and health benefits plan was 
established, implemented, and administered without any 
formal board action other than a 1976 authorization of an 
undertaking to self-insure its health insurance plans and 
an adoption of a Trust Agreement in connection with that 
self-insurance. There is no written delegation of authority 
over Plan matters to any particular corporate officer, either 
by name or by title. On September 1, 1976, Mr. Ehinger 
executed a Plan Constitution as the general instrument 
governing welfare benefits, and thereby purported to create 
a CW retirement benefits Plan that complied with ERISA. 
The board took no part in this action, and its minutes are 
completely silent as to Plan matters until November 8, 
1990, when it sought to retroactively ratify the 1983 SPD 
amendment at issue. In 1978 and 1981, Plan amendments 
providing for an adjustment of health benefits had been 
made by certain managers working under Mr. Ehinger's 
direction. App. at 337-39. Again, corporate records do not 
show formal involvement by either the board or Mr. Berner 
with respect to these amendments. 
 
It is undisputed that Mr. Richard A. DuBois, the 
Corporate Manager for Benefits, and Mr. Aaron J. Carr, 
CW's labor counsel, initially drafted the 1983 SPD 
amendment providing for the termination of health benefits 
for a closed plant's retirees. Here the parties' accounts 
begin to diverge. CW contends, based on the deposition 
testimony of Mr. Ehinger and Mr. Sprigle, that Mr. Berner, 
the President, orally delegated the authority to deal with 
Plan matters to Mr. Ehinger. It further argues that Mr. 
Ehinger explicitly authorized Mr. DuBois and Mr. Carr to 
draft the necessary language in the SPD amendment which 
would provide for a termination of health benefits upon the 
closing of a CW plant. CW points to Mr. Ehinger's 
assertions in his deposition that he read the provision at 
issue and approved it pursuant to his authority over Plan 
administration. App. at 195-97. Plaintiffs, on the other 
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hand, strenuously dispute in their briefs the testimony of 
Mr. Ehinger that he had intentionally amended the SPD 
based on an oral delegation of authority by Mr. Berner. 
Pointing to various alleged inconsistencies in Mr. Ehinger's 
deposition, plaintiffs emphasize that CW issued the SPD 
amendment without ever intending it to be a substantive 
change in policy. 
 
C. The District Court's Disposition on Remand  
 
Based on the record developed on remand, the district 
court considered the motions for summary judgment 
submitted by the plaintiffs and by CW. In initially 
addressing the issue of authority, the court found, relying 
on its earlier opinion, that CW intended to amend the Plan 
in 1983 and did not, as plaintiffs argued, merely seek to 
clarify existing coverage.4 Second, the district court 
identified Mr. Berner as one who possessed the express 
authority to amend the SPD in 1983 based on its reading 
of the corporate by-laws. The court further observed that 
the corporation vested Mr. Ehinger with an implied 
authority to undertake such action because he had 
originally executed the Plan Constitution with the board's 
knowledge. Notably, however, the district court refused to 
find that Mr. Berner orally delegated authority to Mr. 
Ehinger, despite Mr. Ehinger's deposition to that effect, 
because there were "issues of credibility" which the court 
considered inappropriate for resolution at the summary 
judgment stage. Nevertheless, having concluded that Mr. 
Ehinger possessed the necessary authority to amend the 
SPD in 1983 based on the board's silence, the district court 
held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether Mr. Ehinger actually approved the revised SPD 
provisions under his authority. Here, the court once again 
observed that the only support for Mr. Ehinger's actual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Plaintiffs on appeal continue to press their argument that CW never 
intended to "amend" the Plan, but only sought to include this language 
as a "clarification" of existing coverage. We agree with the district 
court 
and find this issue settled by its initial finding, after a bench trial, 
that 
"the language ... providing for a termination of benefits in the event of 
a 
plant closing constituted an amendment of the plan, not a clarification 
of existing terms...." App. at 34. 
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approval was his own testimony at deposition, which it also 
concluded would not constitute an appropriate basis for 
summary judgment because issues of credibility remained. 
 
Because the district court did not find that anyone at CW 
with authority to amend the Plan actually approved the 
SPD amendment, it addressed whether the doctrine of 
ratification provided an appropriate alternative basis to 
hold the 1983 Plan amendment as a valid corporate act. 
Here, the district court concluded that the 1983 letter 
bearing Mr. Sprigle's name and on CW letter head served to 
ratify the revised SPD. Reasoning that Mr. Sprigle 
possessed the authority to act on behalf of the Wood Ridge 
facility, the letter to that plant's retirees advising them of 
the health benefits termination could be considered an 
authorized act on behalf of CW. Thus, the district court 
concluded that even if Mr. Carr and Mr. DuBois had revised 
the SPD without authority from Mr. Ehinger, Mr. Sprigle's 
subsequent actions constituted a valid corporate act 
ratifying the Plan amendment. 
 
Plaintiffs now appeal the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of CW. Our standard of review 
is plenary. Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 




As we have noted, the district court refused tofind, at 
the summary judgment stage, that any corporate officer 
with the appropriate authority actually authorized the 1983 
SPD amendment, despite CW's argument to the contrary. 
CW renews that same contention before us, which the 
plaintiffs again oppose. 
 
In considering the issue of a valid amendment procedure 
under ERISA section 402(b)(3) -- amendment by "the 
Company" -- the Supreme Court held that principles of 
corporate law provide a ready-made set of rules for 
identifying the natural persons authorized to make 
decisions on behalf of a company. Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. 
at 80. Thus, the Court's mandate requires us to determine 
whether there was compliance with Curtiss-Wright's valid 
amendment procedure, which necessarily entails a fact- 
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intensive inquiry into "what persons or committees within 
Curtiss-Wright possessed plan amendment authority, either 
by express delegation or impliedly, and whether those 
persons or committees actually approved the new plan 
provision contained in the revised SPD." Id. at 85 (citing 2 
William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of 
Private Corporations S 444, at 397-98 (perm. rev. ed. 
1992)). Indeed, as the Supreme Court emphasized, only 
natural persons make decisions and the issue now before 
us is whether, on the record, those persons who amended 
the SPD in 1983 acted with corporate authority so that the 
Plan's amendment is properly characterized as a valid 
corporate act or, to use the parlance of ERISA section 
402(b)(3), was an amendment by "the Company."  
 
A. Who Possessed the Authority to Amend the Plan? 
 
1. The Board's Authority to Amend the Plan and 
Delegate Plan Matters 
 
Because it is tacitly conceded that the board possessed 
the authority to amend the Plan, see Del. Code Ann. 
S 141(a), but never actually undertook such an amendment, 
we pause to address the plaintiffs' argument that only the 
board of directors had authority to adopt amendments to 
the Plan in this case. The answer must be that unless 
otherwise provided by the certificate of corporation and 
subject to the limitations set forth in 8 Del. Code Ann. 
S 141(c), the board may freely delegate the authority to 
manage the business and affairs of the corporation. See 1 
R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, The Delaware 
Law of Corporations & Business Organizations S 4.17, at 32 
(collecting cases). Indeed, the ability to delegate is the 
essence of corporate management, as the law does not 
expect the board to fully immerse itself in the daily 
complexities of corporate operation. See Grimes v. Donald, 
673 A.2d 1207, 1215 (Del. 1996) (The board "retains the 
ultimate freedom to direct the strategy and affairs of the 
Company."); Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224, 229 (Del. Ch. 
1921) ("The duties of directors are administrative, and 
relate to supervision, direction and control, the details of 
the business being delegated to inferior officers, agents and 
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employees. This is what is meant by management."); 1 
Balotti & Finkelstein, supra, S 4.17. The record does not 
suggest that the board's delegation of the administration or 
amendment of the Plan would violate CW's certificate of 
corporation or the specific prohibitions embodied in section 
141(c) of the Delaware code. 
 
Nor do we agree with the plaintiffs' assertion that the 
delegation of Plan matters, including its amendment, to a 
corporate officer or agent would necessarily constitute an 
abdication of managerial duties. The business decision of 
appointing a corporate officer to manage retirement health 
benefits for the corporation does not have the effect of 
"removing from directors in a very substantial way their 
duty to use their own best judgment on management 
matters." Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893, 899 (Del. 
Ch. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1957). Moreover, nothing in the record 
demonstrates that a delegation of authority in this context 
would "formally preclude the ... board from exercising its 
statutory powers and fulfilling its fiduciary duty." Grimes, 
673 A.2d at 1214 (citation omitted). The board's 1976 
resolution with respect to the Plan's self-insurance 
illustrates this conclusion. Therefore, contrary to the 
plaintiffs' contentions, the board could freely delegate its 
authority to administer and amend CW's retirement 
benefits plan appropriately. 
 
2. Mr. Berner's Authority to Amend the Plan Pursuant 
to Board Delegation 
 
Beyond the board of directors, the corporation may 
validly act through its directors and officers as authorized 
corporate agents. In general, an officer's powers stem from 
the organic law of the corporation, or a board delegation of 
authority which may be express or implied. 2 William M. 
Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations S 434, at 339 (perm. rev. ed. 1992). Express 
authority to act on behalf of the corporation is usually 
manifested through a statute, the certificate of corporation, 
the by-laws, or a board or shareholder action. Id. S 434, at 
339-40; Petition of Mulco Prods., 123 A.2d 95, 103 (Del. 
Super. Ct.), aff'd sub nom., Mulco Prods., Inc. v. Black, 127 
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A.2d 851 (1956). Implied actual authority, which is express 
authority circumstantially proved, may be found through 
evidence as to the manner in which the business has 
operated in the past, the facts attending the transaction in 
question, circumstantial evidence of board declarations 
surrounding the given transaction, or the habitual usage or 
course of dealing common to the company. 2 Fletcher, 
supra, S 437.2, at 353; Mulco, 123 A.2d at 103. Similarly, 
authority will be implied when it is reasonably necessary 
and proper to effectuate the purpose of the office or the 
main authority conferred.2 Fletcher, supra, S 434, at 340. 
 
Pursuant to these principles of corporate law, the 
undisputed facts show that Mr. Berner, the CEO and 
President of CW possessed the express authority to amend 
the Plan without the board's prior approval. The corporate 
by-laws, adopted by the board, affirmatively bestow on the 
CEO the authority to take "general and active control of 
[the corporation's] business and affairs," which specifically 
includes the power to fix employee compensation. App. at 
441-43. Delaware courts have held that attendant to this 
unqualified grant of authority, the president as general 
manager commands the power to "do anything the 
corporation could do in the general scope and operation of 
its business." Phoenix Finance Corp. v. Iowa-Wisconsin 
Bridge Co., 16 A.2d 789, 793 (Del. Super. Ct. 1940); see 
also Mulco, 123 A.2d at 104. It certainly follows that the 
broad power to fix employee compensation subsumes the 
authority to amend a specific type of compensation-- 
retirement health benefits governed by ERISA -- and logic 
would consequently dictate that the board expressly 
approved the CEO's authority to create, administer, or 
amend CW's retirement plan. Indeed, Delaware courts have 
been receptive to this line of reasoning, and have generally 
upheld a general manager's action on behalf of the 
corporation unless it is "unusual" or "extraordinary." See 1 
Ernest L. Folk, Folk on the Delaware General Corporation 
Law S142.6, at 6-7 (3d ed. 1997). 
 
We once again pause to address plaintiffs' arguments 
against finding express authority vested in Mr. Berner 
pursuant to an express delegation by the board. Plaintiffs 
assert that although Mr. Berner expressly commands the 
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authority to "fix employee compensation," the termination 
of medical benefits would be an "extraordinary" exercise of 
authority that would require explicit board approval. 
Plaintiffs do not point to any record support for this 
contention other than the allegation that it would be 
"outside the ordinary course of business" for the CEO to 
undertake such an action. This argument is unavailing 
particularly in view of the board mandate allowing the CEO 
to fix employee compensation and the complete absence of 
any suggestion that the board intended Plan amendments 
to be subject to its prior approval. In fact, the board 
adopted the by-laws well before the Plan's creation and 
acted in a manner perfectly consistent with the assumption 
that the Plan was valid. If the board had considered the 
Plan's creation as a reasonable act without its prior 
authorization, then surely the board would not have 
considered the Plan's amendment to be so "extraordinary" 
that it was outside Mr. Berner's authority. 
 
3. Mr. Berner's Delegation Under His Authority 
 
As the record demonstrates, however, Mr. Berner did not 
amend the Plan, which leaves us with the necessity to 
decide whether another corporate officer or agent possessed 
the requisite amendatory authority. It is, of course, firmly 
established that an officer broadly charged with managing 
the affairs of a corporation impliedly possesses the 
authority to appoint subordinate agents under his control 
to act on behalf of the corporation. See 2 Fletcher, supra, 
S 503, at 598. Delaware is no stranger to this rule. See 8 
Del. Code S 122(5); 1 Balotti & Finkelstein, supra, S 4.17. 
Nevertheless, the power of delegation is not without limits, 
and the language of case law generally focuses on whether 
the delegated authority involves "ministerial" functions or 
acts that require "the exercise of discretion" by the sub- 
agent. See 2 Fletcher, supra, S 503, at 598. As the very 
term "management" connotes, however, corporate officers 
and subordinate agents must be afforded some level of 
discretion when faced with the demands of supervising a 
modern corporation. Thus, given the "necessities of the case 
and usage," corporate law recognizes that many 
"discretionary" acts will be carried out by officers and other 
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subordinates. 1 Balotti & Finkelstein, supra, S 4.17, at 35 
(citing 2 Fletcher, supra, S 495, at 580); see also Kelly v. 
Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 72 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd, 266 A.2d 878 
(Del. 1970). The critical factors are often the complexity of 
the corporation, see Kelly, 254 A.2d at 72, the intent of the 
board, and the corporation's implied course of conduct. See 
1 Balotti & Finkelstein, supra, S 4.17, at 35 (citing 2 
William F. Fletcher, supra, SS 494-95). 
 
These principles of corporate law, when applied to the 
record before us, lead us to conclude that Mr. Berner 
properly delegated to Mr. Ehinger, one of CW's Executive 
Vice Presidents, the authority to amend the Plan. It is not 
disputed that CW is a large, complex corporation with 
operations well beyond its facilities in New Jersey. While 
plaintiffs assert that the power to amend the Plan was 
outside Mr. Berner's authority to delegate because it was 
not "routine," we do not find this to be the case. To be sure, 
the Plan's amendment required some level of discretion on 
Mr. Ehinger's part, but this would not defeat a proper 
delegation by Mr. Berner in view of his authority. The by- 
laws specifically vest Mr. Ehinger, as Executive Vice 
President, with the authority to "perform all such duties 
and exercise all such powers as may be provided by ... the 
President." App. at 443. Certainly, such a duty would 
include significant changes to the Plan's retirement health 
benefits and there is no indication on the record that the 
board limited the Vice President's authority to "routine" 
matters that would not include significant Plan 
amendments. Moreover, the prior course of dealings 
between Mr. Berner, Mr. Ehinger, and the board -- none of 
which are disputed by the plaintiffs -- all show that Mr. 
Berner and the board were well aware that Mr. Ehinger 
established and administered the current Plan. In light of 
these undisputed facts, we conclude that the validity of the 
Plan's amendment did not depend upon the prior express 
approval of Mr. Berner in his capacity as CW's President 
and CEO. 
 
The district court refused to find such a delegation of 
authority to Mr. Ehinger in fact at the summary judgment 
stage. It did so because, in its view, "issues of credibility" 
remain as to Mr. Ehinger's deposition testimony that he 
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had received an oral authorization by Mr. Berner to manage 
employee benefits. We therefore face the inescapable issue 
of deciding whether there is a "genuine issue of material 
fact" surrounding the delegation of amendatory authority 
from Mr. Berner to Mr. Ehinger. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact 
is "material" if, under the substantive law of the case, it is 
outcome determinative. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A "genuine" issue is one 
where a reasonable jury, based on the evidence presented, 
could hold in the nonmovant's favor with regard to that 
issue. Id. This formulation reflects the same standard as is 
applied in a directed verdict motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50(a), where the court inquires whether reasonable minds 
may differ as to the verdict. Id. at 250. Once the moving 
party has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with 
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Co., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Where the 
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of 
fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no"genuine 
issue for trial." Id. (citation omitted). 
 
Notwithstanding this well settled law, federal courts have 
found difficulty in applying the summary judgment 
standard when faced with certain questions of credibility. 
See 10 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure S 2726, at 115 (2d ed. 1983). It is 
by now axiomatic that "a nonmoving party ... cannot defeat 
summary judgment simply by asserting that a jury might 
disbelieve an opponent's affidavit to that effect." Williams v. 
Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256-57); see also Hozier 
v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165 (3d Cir. 
1990). On the other hand, certain scenarios may arise 
where a material fact cannot be resolved without weighing 
the credibility of a particular witness or individual -- such 
as when the defendant's liability turns on an individual's 
state of mind and the plaintiff has presented circumstantial 
evidence probative of intent. Williams, 901 F.2d at 460. In 
such a case, we have said that summary judgment is 
inappropriate because there is a sufficient quantum of 
evidence on either side for reasonable minds to differ and 
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therefore the issue is "genuine." Id. at 461; see also Hozier, 
908 F.2d at 1165 ("[N]othing in Rule 56 prevents [the 
nonmoving party] from creating a genuine issue of material 
fact by pointing to sufficiently powerful countervailing 
circumstantial evidence."). Indeed, the Advisory Committee 
notes to the federal rules mirror this result. See Advisory 
Committee Notes, 1963 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
But, as the Advisory Committee notes also indicate, it is 
important to emphasize that issues of credibility only defeat 
summary judgment "[w]here an issue of material fact 
cannot be resolved without observation of the demeanor of 
witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility." Id. 
(emphasis added). By logical implication from this rule, if a 
moving party has demonstrated the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact -- meaning that no reasonable jury 
could find in the nonmoving party's favor based on the 
record as a whole -- concerns regarding the credibility of 
witnesses cannot defeat summary judgment. Instead, the 
nonmoving party must "present affirmative evidence in 
order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256-57 (citation 
omitted). Thus, summary judgment is particularly 
appropriate where, notwithstanding issues of credibility, the 
nonmoving party has presented no evidence or inferences 
that would allow a reasonable mind to rule in its favor. In 
this situation, it may be said that the record as a whole 
points in one direction and the dispute is not "genuine." 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. 
 
The record here is replete with evidence showing that Mr. 
Berner had in fact orally delegated the authority to amend 
and administer the Plan to Mr. Ehinger, even apart from 
Mr. Ehinger's own testimony to that effect. Mr. Sprigle, 
CW's other Executive Vice President, testified under oath 
that based on his experience in the corporation Mr. Berner 
had divided responsibilities among Vice Presidents and that 
Mr. Ehinger was delegated matters relating to human 
resources and plan administration. App. at 249. Similarly, 
Mr. Carr, the corporation's labor counsel, submitted an 
affidavit showing that he always understood Mr. Ehinger to 
command operating authority with respect to Plan 
amendments, based on a delegation from Mr. Berner. App. 
at 420. Moreover, it is undisputed that both the human 
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resources department and welfare benefits group reported 
directly to Mr. Ehinger and not to Mr. Berner. App. at 109- 
10. It is also not disputed that Mr. Ehinger had previously 
amended the Plan and reported to Mr. Berner about Plan 
administration. App. at 207. 
 
Against all these affidavits, deposition testimony, and 
undisputed facts, the plaintiffs, who would bear the burden 
of proof on this issue at trial,5 have not set forth even the 
slightest quantum of evidence or reasonable factual 
inference to support a jury finding that Mr. Ehinger had no 
authority to amend Plan benefits. Nor does the record 
reflect any reasonable inference, whether through 
circumstantial evidence or otherwise, that Mr. Ehinger did 
not act under Mr. Berner's oral delegation of authority. 
While the plaintiffs argue that the absence of a written 
delegation creates an inference against authority, corporate 
law clearly allows for oral delegations of authority, see 2 
Fletcher, supra, S 444, at 398 (citing Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, 
226 A.2d 708 (Del. 1967)), and the plaintiffs have offered no 
reason why this lack of writing would seem suspicious. As 
a result, we conclude that plaintiffs did not raise a 
"genuine" issue as to the delegation of authority, even on 
an implied basis, to Mr. Ehinger regarding Plan 
amendments.6 The district court's conclusion that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As CW correctly points out, because plaintiffs seek affirmative relief 
in 
this action, they must establish the invalidity of the amendment in 1983 
under both ERISA law, see Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1163, and under general 
corporate law. See 2 Fletcher, supra, S 437.3. 
 
6. We recognize that in certain situations discovery for a nonmoving 
party may be particularly difficult where the party seeking summary 
judgment has exclusive possession of all the material facts, thereby 
diminishing the nonmovant's ability to show a genuine issue. See, e.g., 
10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 2740, at 536-37 (2d ed. 1983); 6 James W. Moore, Moore's 
Federal Practice S 56.24, at 796 (2d ed. 1996). The plaintiffs have never 
contended, however, that they faced such a problem during any 
discovery phase of litigation. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (allowing a 
district 
court to, among other things, "refuse application for judgment" if it 
appears "from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the 
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify the party's opposition"). Indeed, we note that the plaintiffs 
 
                                17 
  
evidence of delegated authority to Mr. Ehinger by Mr. 
Berner consisted solely of Mr. Ehinger's testimony is too 
narrow a view, based not only on the evidence in the 
record, but also on the realities of modern corporations and 
applicable corporate law. 
 
B. Did the Persons with the Necessary Authority 
       Actually Approve the Amended Plan? 
 
Having identified the persons with the necessary 
authority to amend CW's retirement benefits Plan, we must 
decide whether a person so situated actually exercised that 
authority in 1983. The record, as described above, shows 
that the analysis must focus on the authority delegated to 
Mr. Ehinger in his capacity as the corporation's Executive 
Vice President. We now turn to that record. 
 
It is not disputed that Mr. DuBois, the Corporate 
Manager for Benefits, and Mr. Carr, CW's labor counsel, 
initially drafted the 1983 SPD amendment at issue 
providing for the termination of health benefits for a closed 
plant's retirees. As the parties agree, it is quite clear that if 
Mr. DuBois and Mr. Carr acted without the specific 
authorization of Mr. Ehinger, then the SPD amendment, 
without more, cannot be considered a valid corporate act 
on any delegation theory. The question then is primarily 
factual in nature -- did Mr. Ehinger actually authorize the 
amendment to the Plan in 1983 terminating benefits? Once 
again, the district court denied summary judgment to CW 
on this question because, in its view, "the only evidence in 
the record on this issue is the deposition testimony of 
Ehinger [and] questions of credibility remain." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
exercised their right to cross-examine most material witnesses during 
their depositions. Consequently, the defendant was entitled to summary 
judgment in its favor notwithstanding the "desire... for an opportunity 
to cross examine the [defendant's] witnesses in the hope of turning up 
something ..., at least in the absence of a showing, such as is 
contemplated by Rule 56(f), that all of the facts were necessarily within 
the exclusive knowledge of the plaintiffs and not accessible to the 
defendants." United States ex rel. Kolton v. Halpern, 260 F.2d 590, 591 
(3d Cir. 1958) (Maris, J.). 
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We reiterate at the outset that the burden of showing the 
unauthorized nature of the SPD amendment falls squarely 
on the plaintiffs. See Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 
F.2d 1155, 1163 (3d Cir. 1990). In support of its motion for 
summary judgment, CW points to Mr. Ehinger's testimony 
that he approved the SPD termination language during its 
drafting. App. at 207-208. In addition to the deposition 
testimony of Mr. Ehinger, Mr. Carr also submitted an 
affidavit that Mr. Ehinger approved the decision to 
terminate benefits. App. at 421. Further, it is not disputed 
that the decision to amend the Plan was the result of 
similar issues raised by litigation that occurred over the 
earlier closing of CW's Marquette facility in Cleveland. App. 
35. Indeed, plaintiffs do not deny that Mr. Ehinger and the 
benefits group played a significant role in that litigation and 
anticipated a change in the present Plan description to 
avoid future litigation. App. at 115. 
 
Against this evidence, plaintiffs point to only two relevant 
instances in the record which they claim would allow a 
reasonable jury to conclude in their favor and therefore 
render the issue genuine. First, plaintiffs again emphasize 
that there is no documentation -- whether a memorandum, 
resolution, or otherwise -- reflecting Mr. Ehinger's actual 
exercise of authority. As we have stated before, however, 
the law recognizes an oral delegation or exercise of 
authority, which may be proved by parol evidence. See, e.g., 
2 Fletcher, supra, S 444, at 398 (citing Hessler, Inc. v. 
Farrell, 226 A.2d 708 (Del. 1967)); Restatement (Second) of 
Agency SS 26, 33 (1958). Thus, while we agree that CW's 
record keeping is not a paragon of desirable corporate 
practice, the plaintiffs have offered no reason why the 
absence of documentation, when the law requires none, 
should be subject to suspicion or provide a basis for a 
reasonable inference in their favor, particularly in view of 
the corporation's established practices to the contrary. Cf. 
Ansin v. River Oaks Furniture, Inc., 105 F.3d 745, 755 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (where a transaction would ordinarily leave a 
"heavy paper trial," an inference of fact arises from a 
"complete absence of contemporaneous documentation"); 
Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165-66 
(3d Cir. 1990) (where a memorandum written in 
contemplation of a merger does not include a new ERISA 
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benefits schedule, a factual inference is created because the 
author had personal knowledge of the transaction and the 
omission seemed "odd" from the circumstances of the case). 
But on the undisputed evidence of CW's corporate practice, 
we conclude that the absence of record documentation 
reflecting the nature and exercise of Mr. Ehinger's authority 
is not sufficiently probative that it provides, without more, 
a basis for a reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiffs. 
 
Plaintiffs also point to Mr. Ehinger's deposition testimony 
in 1986 where he stated: 
 
        It had been the policy of the Curtiss-Wright 
       Corporation, which was put in practice in closing the 
       East Paterson facility in 1971 ... [and] the Marquette 
       facility, that post-retirement insurance would terminate 
       at the closing of the facility. 
 
        I expected my personnel to reflect such policy in 
       such documents. I did not myself read the individual 
       policies or question them where does it say what in it. 
 
App. at 136 (emphasis added by plaintiffs). Plaintiffs argue 
that Mr. Ehinger's admission of not having read the 
individual benefits policies supports their contention that 
he did not specifically authorize the Plan amendment in 
1983. We believe plaintiffs' conclusion is a non sequitur. 
Simply because Mr. Ehinger did not read the individual 
retirement health benefits policies does not mean that he 
did not authorize the change in the language of the 
amendment. In fact, Mr. Ehinger specifically states that he 
"expected [his] personnel to reflect such[a] policy in [the] 
documents," which at least raises an inference that he 
authorized any changes in the Plan that would conform to 
his expectations. Id. We therefore do notfind this 
deposition testimony to create a genuine issue of material 
fact in the plaintiffs' favor. 
 
Beyond these two arguments, which lack merit, plaintiffs 
do not identify any other instance in the record developed 
on remand that would render the question of Mr. Ehinger's 
exercise of authority a "genuine" dispute. This is not a case 
where a material issue of fact "cannot be resolved without 
observation of the demeanor of witnesses in order to 
evaluate their credibility." Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. 
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R. Civ. P. 56(e). The record points in but one direction and, 




In view of our conclusions, we need not address the 
district court's reliance on the doctrine of ratification and 




For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the 
district court in Curtiss-Wright's favor will be affirmed. 
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